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Abstract 
This white paper offers cautionary observations about the planning and development of new, 
large radio astronomy instruments.  Complexity is a strong cost driver so every effort should be 
made to assign differing science requirements to different instruments and probably different 
sites.  The appeal of shared resources is generally not realized in practice and can often be 
counterproductive.  Instrument optimization is much more difficult with longer lists of 
requirements, and the development process is longer and less efficient.  More complex 
instruments are necessarily further behind the technology state of the art because of longer 
development times.   Including technology R&D in the construction phase of projects is a 
growing trend that leads to higher risks, cost overruns, schedule delays, and project de-scoping.  
There are no technology breakthroughs just over the horizon that will suddenly bring down the 
cost of collecting area.  Advances come largely through careful attention to detail in the 
adoption of new technology provided by industry and the commercial market.  Radio 
astronomy instrumentation has a very bright future, but a vigorous long-term R&D program not 
tied directly to specific projects needs to be restored, fostered, and preserved. 
  
Large Instrument Development for Radio Astronomy 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The size, cost, and sophistication of radio astronomy instrumentation have grown enormously 
in its relatively short history and must continue to grow.  New discoveries and the solutions to 
fundamental problems will require continued technological advances.  However, greater 
technical sophistication does not necessarily mean that greater complexity is required.  We 
argue in this white paper that strategies must be adopted for reducing complexity and that the 
trend toward very large international instruments could be counterproductive.  The advantages 
of scale and shared infrastructure will be more than offset by inefficiencies of management 
complexity and scientific and technical compromises.  Most of the fruits of collaboration can 
and do occur at the individual and institutional level in ways that already work very well.  The 
advantages of competing approaches and higher risks permitted at smaller scale must be at the 
heart of radio astronomy for the indefinite future, not just as precursors to projects that consume 
most of our resources. 
 
One prevailing assumption is that, through a combination of pooling of resources and being 
much cleverer, we can create one or two orders of magnitude increases in sensitivity and fields 
of view for the cost of a moderate size space mission.  In fact, there is only a modest amount of 
untapped cleverness or new technology waiting to be employed that will make the more 
visionary advances possible in the coming decade.  As prosaic as they appear, the current front-
line instruments in radio astronomy are reasonably well optimized for cost and scientific 
capability.  To a first approximation, ten times as much money will buy ten times as much 
collecting area, all else being equal.  The same factor of ten in cost will not buy ten times the 
collecting area, ten times the field of view, and maintain the wide frequency coverage, 
instantaneous bandwidth, system temperatures, and spatial resolution of the best current 
instruments.  The total performance to cost ratio is not poised to make a great leap forward as is 
implied in our grander proposals, Moore's law notwithstanding.  Trade-offs can be optimized 
for different scientific problems, but not all in the same facility. 
 
Transformational technology is rare and starts small. 
 
The vast majority of new technology employed by radio astronomy is developed in industries 
with far greater resources for research and development.  There are notable exceptions to this 
general rule, such as SIS mixers, but these exceptions are rare.  Even the transformative 
technology of cryogenic amplifiers using High-electron-mobility Field-Effect Transistors 
(HFETs), resulted from a brilliant recognition that a particular run of HFET's developed for 
other purposes work extremely well when cooled.  The best HFET chips employed in nearly all 
receivers over the past two decades come from a very small number of fortuitously good 
semiconductor wafers. 
 
Technological advances in radio astronomy are largely the result of careful attention to detail 
and the adoption of new technology from the consumer and industrial market.  What we are 
good at is adapting technology for our purpose, but, on average, the technology in use by 
today's best radio telescopes is 10 to 20 years old.  Larger pieces of instrumentation tend to 
contain older technology.  For some things, such as antennas, where the technology changes 
slowly, there is only minor disadvantage to age, but for subsystems such as signal processing 
the age penalty is enormous.  Size and complexity are the enemies of signal processing cost 
over the lifetime of an instrument.  This applies to all aspects of the developments cycle - 
specification, hardware design, software design, debugging and verification, and user 
interfaces.  Efforts to segregate scientific requirements into categories with similar 
instrumentation needs can pay dividends compared to current practices and should be a major 
consideration in new instrument developments. 
 
“Shared resources” is a fuzzy concept whose advantages we take on faith.  This tends to lock us 
into the circular assumptions that: (1) we can afford only one big instrument so (2) it must 
satisfy as many scientific requirements as possible, which (3) makes it complex, costly, and 
slow to build, and, therefore (4) we can afford only one every 20 years.  A few sub-disciplines, 
such as pulsar astronomy, have elected to resist this cycle by continuously developing small 
instruments with lifetimes less than about ten years.  The trend in this field is to reduce the 
development time even further.  Pulsar astronomers are more attuned to signal processing 
technology so they reap the advantages of faster development cycles made possible by 
improvements in the cost of computation.  This strategy could be applied in other areas, but the 
advantages are not as evident to other scientists.  The operations budget of a large instrument 
should assume the need for aggressive and continuous enhancements with a sustained 
technology R&D program to reduce the need for infrequent, very expensive, and disruptive 
major upgrades. 
 
Clearly, something such as a signal correlator for a synthesis array cannot be divided into sub 
arrays with the same total capability, but serious consideration should be given to the question 
of whether the same correlator should serve more than two or three octaves of observing 
frequency.  Higher frequencies need more bandwidth, and lower frequencies need more 
dynamic range.  A narrower-bandwidth correlator built for low-frequencies may be built with 
field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) whose flexibility can be turned toward RFI excision 
and pulsar applications.  These functions would only add unnecessary complexity to a wider-
bandwidth correlator that must be built for high frequencies with application-specific integrated 
circuits (ASICs) which require large non-recurring engineering (NRE) costs. 
 
New technologies are often cited as reasons to expect that great advances in capability are on 
the horizon.  Examples include object-oriented programming, MMICs, FPGAs, hydroformed 
reflectors, and ultra-wideband antennas.  Indeed, each of these is a significant advance to be 
exploited, but each involves system compromises and concurrent advances in related 
technologies that moderate their advantages to new system capability.  In practice, advances 
such as these require a great deal of spade work to learn and incorporate the new technology.  
The advantages of scale are also sometimes cited as reasons for optimism that a big new 
instrument will be less costly per unit performance.  The reality is that in radio astronomy parts 
quantities are orders of magnitude smaller than those in the consumer market, even for the most 
ambitious proposed systems, so the cost savings of quantity are mostly in amortized NRE, not 
in mass-manufacturing advantages. 
 
Different Frequency Ranges Require Different Antennas and Different Sites 
 
Antennas work very well over about one decade of frequency range.  Surface and pointing 
errors erode efficiency of reflector antennas at frequencies above their optimum range.  At 
lower frequencies diffraction effects reduce efficiency and increase spillover noise, particularly 
in a Cassegrain or Gregorian system where diffraction is most affected by the relatively small 
subreflector.  Above the highest optimum frequency the beam size is smaller, and the antenna 
weight and wind resistance are greater than necessary for the effective collecting area achieved.  
Hence, the system is penalized in field of view, and the demands on the pointing system are 
much higher.  Radio astronomers have done remarkably well at squeezing the most out of 
antennas beyond their optimum frequency ranges in the absence of anything better, but we have 
forgotten how severe the compromises have been.  As we consider radio telescope systems with 
very large collecting areas, extreme dynamic range demands, and barely affordable costs, 
efficiency and accuracy compromises become much more costly than with current instruments. 
 
At frequencies above about 10 GHz atmospheric effects are the greatest factors in selecting a 
site.  Below about 1.5 GHz, radio frequency interference (RFI) is the strongest consideration.  
Above this frequency most strong RFI at any reasonable radio astronomy site comes from 
satellites from which even very sparsely populated areas are not immune.  Locations such as 
southern Africa and Western Australia are indisputable choices for new low-frequency arrays.  
At higher frequencies the site choices are more diverse, and factors such as accessibility, 
longest available baselines, and existing infrastructure will play a larger role in the site selection 
process. 
 
How important is a common site? 
 
Proponents of the next generation of radio telescopes cite shared infrastructure and operating 
resources as a strong reason for selecting a common location for most new construction.  If we 
accept that systems optimization and reduced complexity are good arguments for building 
different antennas and correlators for different frequency ranges, then the shared infrastructure 
is fairly basic - roads, power lines, cable trenches, housing, and the like.  The total power 
requirements, communications bandwidth, high-level operations and maintenance personnel 
will be roughly the same for three substantially different instruments at one site compared to 
three separate sites.  Attempts to share key components of different instruments, such as 
correlators, antennas, or data transmission bandwidth will reduce the observing time available 
for each frequency range. 
 
Any one instrument will be staffed well above critical mass for a viable intellectual and 
management environment.  Collaborations at the component and subsystem development level 
do and will happen between people scattered all over the world whenever there is mutual 
benefit.  A light-weight international management system to clear administrative impediments 
and foster communications will be very helpful, but most of the professional exchange channels 
have been in place for decades and are very effective.  Collaborations will form and dissolve as 
the needs and opportunities arise. 
 
Another advantage of assigning scientific and technical requirements to different instruments is 
that fewer organizations need be involved in the details of funding and siting of each 
instrument.  Satisfying the different, sometimes conflicting, regulatory and political 
requirements of a number of different funding agencies forces expenditure decisions to be made 
which may not be optimum based on scientific or technical considerations. In addition to leaner 
management structures, there are advantages to unlocking funding time lines, site selections, 
and development schedules. 
 
How important is system temperature? 
 
The best radio astronomy receivers regularly operate with system temperatures that are pretty 
close to the limits set by atmospheric and cosmic background noise plus the inevitable antenna 
spillover noise. However, these cryogenic receivers are heavy, big, and relatively expensive, 
and their bandwidths are generally limited to about 50% of center frequency.  The demands of 
much greater collecting area and fields of view make current receiver designs impractical for 
many concepts for much larger collecting area and fields of view.  Hence, the prevailing design 
trend is to accept higher system temperature from uncooled receivers or receivers cooled to 
higher temperatures and to recoup the lost sensitivity with more collecting area or more beams 
on the sky.  This trade-off has not yet been shown to be beneficial in a full design optimization. 
 
The problem is that for a given point source sensitivity the collecting area required is inversely 
proportional to the system temperature, and for a single aperture the field of view is inversely 
proportional to collecting area.  To recover the field of view, more beams must be created with 
extra hardware and signal processing power.  A synthesis array could add more antennas of the 
same size to maintain the field of view, but this drives up a large portion of the signal 
processing costs in proportion to the square of the system temperature.  The post-correlation 
data processing load will also be driven up by the increase in the number of antennas or number 
of simultaneous beams.  The costs of much larger apertures are going to be strongly dependent 
on the cost of signal processing, so this is not a place where sensitivity can be economically 
recovered. 
 
In presentations of alternative solutions for building greater collecting area and field of view 
there is a disturbing tendency to take an incomplete view of the optimization trade-offs, always 
to the benefit of the particular point of view.  Honest assessments of subsystem costs that meet 
the scientific requirements are usually daunting.  This leads to a round of requirements 
trimming and parameter adjustments to get the total cost below a value believed to be feasible.  
Every step in this trimming process is biased in an optimistic direction, usually unconsciously.  
The result is a powerful recipe for cost inflation and design and construction delays when hard 
reality must be reckoned.  Funding cycle times have not increased with increased specification 
and costing times of larger projects.  The result is that few, if any, new large projects have had 
the time to establish reasonably accurate costs before full-scale funding campaigns begin. 
 
What is needed and what is possible. 
 
As the size and complexity of instruments have grown there are fewer and fewer individuals 
who can effectively weigh the scientific and technical trade-offs of a new system design.  
Hence, we have evolved into a rather linear process beginning with science requirements 
followed by system design and implementation.  Scientific requirements are generally set by a 
committee of vested interests.  The result is an "anding" of most, if not all individual 
requirements.  Feedback on how various and sometimes conflicting science requirements affect 
cost and design and construction time is usually based on insufficient information. 
 
Overly ambitious specifications become "goals", which are generally treated as firm 
specifications in the design process because there is no weighting metric for the transition from 
requirement to goal.  A commercial supplier will ignore a goal for lack of strong financial 
incentive.  Staff engineers treat goals in a variety of ways, depending on their individually 
perceived weights of the required compromises.  They may have no immediate incentive to 
reduce cost; otherwise the goal would have been dropped in the first place.  A variation on the 
fuzzy "goal" concept is the request to "not design it out."  This can be even more costly than 
goals and an even greater cost driver than the well-defined specifications.  If scientists knew 
that the time between new instrumentation upgrades were shorter than is now typical, the 
propensity toward squeezing all requirements into one design and modifying requirements in 
mid-project may be reduced. 
 
Shortcomings in the linear requirements-through-design process are dealt with in several levels 
of project review with titles such as "conceptual", "preliminary", "critical", "pre-production", 
and "final".  These usually involve a lot of report and presentation preparation and travel.  
There is definite value in these reviews, but any scientist with a strong interest in 
instrumentation design will recognize how inefficient the process is and may dread being 
assigned to one of these review committees.  These inefficiencies, as a fraction of total project 
cost, grow with project complexity for a given level of talent and expertise.  An additional 
danger of excessive reliance on the review "process" is that it can lull a project into a false 
sense of security.  We cannot review the answer to a question that we are not clever enough to 
ask.  Modern radio telescopes are sufficiently close to the state of the art that we should at all 
times admit the possibility of a surprise.  There is no substitute for experience and adequate 
prototyping. 
 
We believe there are measures we can take to improve this process.  They begin with a greater 
level of trust and communication between scientists and engineers.  If an engineer says that 
there is a certain level of uncertainty and risk in meeting certain requirements, this needs to be 
taken at face value and built into the management process.  Scientists need to be free to 
communicate the relative weights they place on different requirements with the confidence that 
stretched goals will be neither ignored nor taken as requirements at any cost. 
 
Everyone needs to understand that the only designs for which accurate costs and production 
times are available are ones that have been fully prototyped and tested.  The most frequent 
cause of project de-scoping and/or cost overruns is overly optimistic cost and development time 
estimates based on insufficient prototyping.  We should always be pushing the envelope, but 
deferring R&D time and costs until after a project is funded will cause the project cost to 
become less and less certain, almost always in the direction of underestimated cost and overly 
optimistic schedules.  Paper studies are not a substitute for full prototyping. 
 
Prototyping is an enormously valuable and under-appreciated skill.  Too little prototyping does 
not sufficiently retire risks and too much wastes time and resources.  Initial prototyping is 
exploratory, and later stages are aimed at reliability and cost control.  "Demonstrator" projects 
are often good examples of poor prototyping.  They are often built to convince committees and 
funding agencies that a project is viable.  They spend far too much time on building subsystems 
that are already well understood, and too few resources are allocated to retiring real risks. 
 
Experts need far more detailed proof that key unknowns are under control than is typically 
provided by a "demonstrator."  Non-experts, even renowned scientists, are easily fooled by an 
impressive but superficial presentation. 
 
All risks cannot be retired before the beginning of a project, and improvements of the design at 
any stage of construction are possible, but the zero-contingency budget must be consistent with 
a high certainty of on-time completion that meets the core specifications.  Higher risks must be 
consistent with a higher contingency.  This seems so obvious, but through a combination of 
naiveté, wishful thinking, and funding desperation, it is being treated far too lightly in the 
current generation of proposals.  Visionaries come from the ranks of those without a sobering 
failure under their belt. 
 
How much preliminary R&D is enough and how is it evaluated? 
 
Research and development is reasonably cheap in the grand scheme of research facilities.   
A minimum, viable, long-term R&D program will very roughly require a budget of two percent 
of the annual operating costs of existing observing facilities.  This would pay for research 
engineer salaries, technician support, new test equipment, and supplies.  One reason that this 
activity is not being pursued at an adequate level is that this money is discretionary in the short 
term and hard to protect under tight budget conditions.  Another reason is that review panels at 
funding agencies are requiring closer and closer ties of instrument development to immediate 
scientific return.  Hence, a growing fraction of instrument development funds is going into 
construction at the expense of more innovative device or system development. 
 
Since good R&D is inherently high risk, deliverables are hard to promise. A perfectly valid 
result in six months time is that a certain approach will not work, and now we know why.  Each 
step in the process can be a branch point – “this worked, keep going,” or “this didn't work, try 
something else.”  New ideas are being generated all the time, and even perfectly valid 
approaches may be set aside in pursuit of a better idea.  How is the quality of R&D to be 
judged?  A good R&D manager or mentor will know but may find it hard to articulate.  
Proposal review panel members will find it more difficult because of their distance from the 
process. 
 
A good operational definition of an exceptional R&D person is that we don't know what she or 
he will produce, but, whatever it is, it will be useful and more than worth the small investment.  
In other words, R&D is judged by results, not predetermined deliverables.  These results must 
be relevant to the source of support, but they are not necessarily aimed at a specific scientific 
requirement.  A good technology researcher knows the long-term goals of the science well 
enough to develop devices and techniques before most scientists know they need them. 
 We need time to learn from new instruments and new technology 
 
The full potential of new instruments takes considerable time to develop.  Wider bandwidths 
present big challenges to data processing algorithms for accommodating frequency-dependent 
primary beam size, shape, and rotation, for example.  The process of learning how to take 
advantage of new instrumentation invariably suggests improvements that were not foreseen in 
the original design.  Larger, more complex instruments are more difficult to modify and take a 
longer time to respond to the learning process.  New instruments built before their predecessors 
have run their course will make some of the same mistakes.  All new technology and 
improvements in data analysis and observational strategies results from a clear understanding of 
past experience.  This takes time. 
 
Bigger does not necessarily mean more complex, and the reverse is also true.  Some forms of 
complexity can be encapsulated and confidently retired.  Very large scale integrated (VLSI) 
circuits are a good examples.  Systems, such as large antenna structures, may be well 
understood from previous experience so their risk and cost uncertainty are relatively small.  
Software has proven much more problematic, and attempts to hide its complexity have met with 
very limited success.  Even more unsettling is the fact that there is no common agreement on 
why this is the case.  The jury is still out on firmware, the programming code that resides in 
FPGA’s.  The versatility of FPGAs for high speed signal processing is widely touted, but this 
could cause firmware to elude cost control, much like software.  If firmware modules prove 
nearly as stable as VLSI chips, there’s reason for optimism, but that risk has yet to be retired. 
 
This white paper does not argue against large-scale radio astronomy instrumentation as such.  
We do offer a strong caution against complexity in the name of shared resources.  New 
sophistication takes time to assimilate.  Cost and schedule overruns and de-scoping experience 
with recent projects must be taken very seriously and the lessons thoroughly understood before 
attempting new large endeavors. 
 
Related reading 
 
Three articles in the November 2008 issue of IEEE Spectrum Magazine on weapons 
procurement describe some uncomfortable parallels with the specification, design, 
development, and funding process being employed in the coming generation of large radio 
astronomy instruments.  Some useful cautions can be found in these articles.  
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/nov08/6931  http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/nov08/6934  
http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/nov08/6935  
